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Introduction 
It is no secret that in the build-up to the invasion of Iraq, the cracks in the transatlantic 
relationship were critically exposed, with France openly campaigning the UN for a “non” on a 
security resolution over Iraq, massive anti-US demonstrations on February 15, 2003 around the 
world, and exchanging of harsh words between the US and European leaders in the media.  This 
crisis ignited a hot debate in the press, among academics and foreign policy elites over who and 
what was to blame for this split.  Assigning blame however does not answer the question of what 
is the state of the transatlantic relationship.  It simply assumes that the relationship is broken.  
Assessing the transatlantic relationship is much more complicated than merely assigning blame 
because the relationship is so complex. 
The world has changed since the end of the Cold War, when the transatlantic alliance as 
we know it was forged.  There are new security threats facing the United States and Europe.  
North Korea and Iran are developing nuclear technologies and Islamist fundamentalism is 
spreading, breeding international terrorism.  The world markets are opening as the phenomenon 
of globalization expands.  The Indian and Chinese economies are steadily growing, as China and 
India become global players.    Europe has integrated more deeply, with most member states of 
the European Union using a single currency.  It has also expanded to include 25 member states.  
The meaning of being European is changing.  The United States no longer seeks to contain its 
threats; instead it chooses a policy of preemption.  Because of the new shape of the world, the 
transatlantic relationship needs to be completely reevaluated in the context of these changes. 
The transatlantic relationship is a historical relationship, an economic relationship and a 
security relationship—if one thinks of the transatlantic relationship as a stool, these are the three 
legs.  To develop a clear picture of the state of the transatlantic relationship, to have a 
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meaningful debate over what has happened to the transatlantic relationship, the three legs need to 
be examined to see if the transatlantic alliance is still intact and how it works today.   
This paper shall show the transatlantic relationship has three facets: historical, economic 
and security and that before a grand debate takes place over the “end of the relationship,” a 
systematic reevaluation of the three facets needs to be conducted to measure the state of the 
transatlantic relationship.  To do this, I shall first trace the history of the transatlantic relationship 
and the evolving historical, economic and security ties. I shall then show the debate surrounding 
the transatlantic relationship as it stands today to show what scholars are writing about the 
transatlantic relationship.  I argue that before scholars talk about the end of the transatlantic 
relationship, the state of the transatlantic relationship needs to be measured. I will give an 
example of the systematic reevaluation I believe to be necessary by examining the security 
aspect of the relationship. I will show that the security facet of the relationship, while 
operational, is weakened in the current global climate.  I will point to future analysis that should 
take place and draw some broader conclusions about the transatlantic relationship and the debate 
surrounding it. 
To show the evolution of the transatlantic relationship, I shall use historical sources, both 
primary and secondary.  To show the debate surrounding the transatlantic relationship, I shall use 
a sample of books and articles written by scholars to show the spectrum of the debate.  To 
measure the state of the transatlantic relationship security alliance, I will examine the operational 
coordination between the United States and Europe, the philosophical understanding of threats 
the United States and Europe hold and the respect each side holds for one another.  I use 
statements from leaders and public opinion polls for evidence.  Decisions in foreign policy are 
made at the top by the leaders.  They are influenced by other political players including military 
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leaders, businesses, and special-interest groups, to name a few, but ultimately the leaders make 
the final decisions.  I have chosen to include public opinion polls for evidence as well because in 
democracies, the public holds their leaders accountable for their actions.  The public’s view on 
the transatlantic relationship can hold powerful checks on the leadership in democracies and 
even determine the make-up of their leadership. I also use newspaper articles for examples of the 
operational cooperation between countries.   
The Historical Evolution of the Transatlantic Relationship 
  The relationship between the US and Europe has gone through many transformations 
and is continually evolving and changing.  The relationship however, has always centered on 
historical ties and shared values, economic connections and security.  Europe and America have 
been connected since the colonization of the North American continent by the European powers.  
The United States “had been established by war at the expense of European powers such as 
Britain, France and Spain, and also by seizing territory from Mexico and from the Native 
American Indians” (Reynolds 24).  After Spain financed Christopher Columbus’s discovery of 
the New World for Europe, it illustrated that, “profits could be made in a new arena for 
commerce across the Atlantic.  France and England tried to follow Spain’s lead” (Roark et al 46).  
Indeed the British settled in what is now the eastern United States, the Spanish settled in what is 
now Mexico and the southwest United States, and the French settled in Canada.  In the 
eighteenth century, there were settlers from England, Scotland, Ireland, the Netherlands, 
Germany, bringing their culture and values with them from Europe, and there were African 
slaves in the colonies.  In the middle colonies, Germans made up the largest contingent of 
immigrants from the European continent with more than 100,000 Germans in the colonies in 
1770 (Roark et al 109).   
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European countries were so attached to their territories in the colonies that France and 
England went to war on the North American continent in the French and Indian War.  The 
British had to find a way to pay for this war and raised taxes on the American colonies.  This 
caused resentment among the colonists who thought it was unfair to be taxed when they did not 
have a say in parliament.  This ultimately led to the Revolutionary War when the American 
colonists declared independence from the British crown.  France aided the colonies militarily in 
the Revolution.  In 1778, the French and the confederated government signed an alliance 
promising aid if France became under attack (Roark et al 226).   
  When England and France went to war, French versus British loyalty became a “very 
delicate and critical” foreign policy issue as Americans were divided between loyalty to the 
French for their help in the Revolutionary War and strong commercial ties with the British 
(Roark et al 226).  Ultimately the United States stayed out of the European war, but kept trading 
with France.  Due to British displeasure with this, the United States made major concessions to 
the British while securing some favorable commercial agreements for the United States in the 
Jay Treaty (Roark et al 226).  Loyalty to France or Britain became a distinction between the 
Republicans and Federalists, the two early political parties in the United States (Roark et al 226-
7). 
Indeed, the economic and military ties between the United States and Europe were 
evident from the settlement of Europeans in the North American continent.  American security 
concerns with France led to the expansion of the United States with the Louisiana Purchase.  
Jefferson was scared by the agreement that the Spanish would cede the West to the French so he 
sent Livingston to buy New Orleans (Roark et al 239).  Livingston came back with the Louisiana 
Purchase, greatly expanding American territory.   
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The United States stayed out of European affairs, militarily, until World War I, but its ties 
to Europe continued to grow as immigrants arrived from northern and western Europe.  In the 
early 1880s, “new” immigrants from southern and eastern Europe began to arrive (Davidson et al 
548).  In 1900, immigrants made up 15% of the population (Davidson et al 549).   
“American economic and cultural ties to the Allies, along with German submarine 
warfare, brought Americans into [World War I]” (Davidson et al 644).  Indeed, despite President 
Wilson’s urge to remain impartial in thought as well as in action, true impartiality was 
impossible as German-Americans and Austrian-Americans tended to sympathize with the 
Central Powers in WWI, and most Americans, through the bonds of language, culture and 
history could not help but sympathize with the British; additionally, there was still a “tug of 
loyalty” to the French for their aid in the Revolution (Davidson et al 653).  Economic ties 
augmented American interest in the outcome of WWI as trade between the US and the Allies 
grew from $800 million to $3 billion between 1914 and 1916 (Davidson et al 653).   
In the 1920s, the United States used money power for diplomatic ends, by encouraging 
private bankers to cooperate in public interest to finance European financial stabilization.  
Foreign loans also helped lubricate US trade.  By 1930, the US economy was vital to the 
prosperity of the world (Reynolds 28-9).  Despite the economic ties to Europe, early in President 
Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s term, US interests were not significantly touched by events in 
Europe or Asia (Reynolds 36).  This all changed as fascism took hold in Europe.   
In Roosevelt’s mind, the United States could no longer think of itself as safe because of 
the barrier provided by two oceans due to the advent of the air age (Reynolds 43).  Because of 
new technologies, the US faced the possibility of European attack in the northern and southern 
regions of the western hemisphere (Reynolds 45).  Additionally, the US was confronted with the 
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prospect of trying to exist in a closed world, dominated by closed fascist blocs.  Indeed, it was 
argued that liberal capitalism could not survive in such a divided world (Leffler 30).  Roosevelt 
routinely argued “American security was not divisible from that of the world,” and insisted “that 
American values could not flourish in an alien ideological environment” (Reynolds 52). His 
sentiments were echoed by Walter Lippman, an influential Atlanticist who argued that the United 
States could not tolerate a hostile sea power on the European side of the Atlantic (Reynolds 128).   
Roosevelt began selling Americans on the idea that the “first line of defense in the United 
States” was the “continued independent existence” of Britain and France (Reynolds 48).  US 
media began depicting Britain as tied to American values through reminders of “the transatlantic 
cultural heritage of language and literature, religion and law” (Reynolds 98).  Public opinion 
began to shift, highlighting a sense of connection rather than separation between Western Europe 
and North America (Reynolds 127).  All of this culminated in the creation of the Atlantic Charter 
(1941), a statement of the “common principles in the national policies” of the United Kingdom 
and the United States on which Churchill and Roosevelt “base their hopes for a better future for 
the world” (The Atlantic Charter).  The Atlantic Charter stresses the common democratic and 
liberal principles of freedom of choice of government, equal access to trade and raw materials, 
economic advancement and social security, freedom of movement, and freedom from fear and 
want.   
Following the victory in World War II, the United States, for its own national security, 
primarily wanted to ensure that no potential adversary or coalition of adversaries gained control 
over resources in Europe and Asia (Leffler 48).  “Even the specter of such a situation would 
force the United States to prepare for conflict, to reconfigure its economy, to limit political 
freedoms and to become a garrison state” (Leffler 48).  So the United States engaged in Europe 
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after WWII because they felt inaction would enable the Soviets to take advantage of the 
circumstances to their favor and threaten US national security (Leffler 57).  Facing a financial 
crisis in 1947, the British threatened to pull out of Greece and suspend assistance to Turkey, 
leaving the United States alone in containing Soviet expansion (Leffler 56).  The United States 
responded with the Truman Doctrine, offering military aid and economic assistance to Greece 
and Turkey and a plan to unify the three western zones of Germany, as well as the Marshall Plan 
extending large amounts of aid to European countries who were willing to coordinate recovery 
plans (Leffler 56).  The world was looking to the United States to maintain peace and the United 
States could only achieve that by engaging in Europe.   
The Europeans wanted more than an economic assurance that the United States was 
going to prevent Soviet expansion in Europe.  They needed assurance that the United States 
would help “protect them against internal unrest and external pressure” (Leffler 77).  To achieve 
this, the United States negotiated its first non-wartime military alliance, the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (Davidson et al 799).   
The North Atlantic Treaty speaks of developing further friendly relations between parties, 
to eliminate conflict in economic policies, and encourage economic collaboration between 
parties to the treaty.  Additionally, the treaty speaks of consultation on important security matters 
affecting parties to the treaty.  Perhaps most significantly, the treaty declares that an armed attack 
against one or more parties to the treaty in Europe or North America shall be considered an 
attack against them all and if such an attack occurs, each will assist the attacked party or parties 
(North Atlantic Treaty Art. 5).  Europe and America were officially united for a common 
purpose, which at that time meant to contain indigenous Communism at home and Soviet power 
abroad (Leffler 82).   
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This new alliance did not go without its trials during the Cold War.  The Europeans were 
outraged at President Kennedy’s conduct during the Cuban Missile Crisis, by possibly putting 
the whole world in danger without consulting the Europeans.  Additionally in Europe there were 
bouts of Euro-centricism followed by Atlanticism, but the alliance survived and NATO became 
the “jewel in the crown of Cold War security structures” (Bacevich 74).  The alliance became 
more than just a military pact, President George H.W. Bush argued.  Indeed, he argued that 
NATO had a larger purpose to “enrich our peoples, create new opportunities and fuel growth” 
(Bacevich 75).  
The transatlantic alliance that was in place at the end of the Cold War faced an identity 
crisis in the new world order.  Globalization became the international system that replaced the 
cold-war system, according to Thomas Friedman (Bacevich 38).  With the end of the threat of 
Communism and Soviet expansion, however, there was never any talk of dismantling the 
alliance.  Indeed, the Cold War strategy of containment yielded a number of institutions and 
partnerships for America, such as NATO, that survived the end of the Cold War by providing a 
bulwark for stability through commitment and reassurance (Ikenberry 45).  NATO needed a new 
purpose and achieved that with eastward expansion to former Warsaw pact states including 
Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic (Bacevich 103).  Under President Clinton, NATO 
converted from a defense alliance into a vehicle for projecting power out of area, which 
manifested itself in the campaigns in the former Yugoslavia (Bacevich 75, 103).  Bacevich 
argues that the intervention in Bosnia was not about Bosnia alone, but also about Europe and US 
leadership in Europe (103).  In 1999, NATO re-defined its fundamental security acts as acting as 
a foundation of stability in the Euro-Atlantic area, serving as a forum for consultation on security 
issues, deterring and defending against any threat of aggression against any NATO member 
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state, contributing to conflict prevention and promoting cooperation and dialogue with other 
countries in the Euro-Atlantic area (NATO Transformed).   
Despite the cooperation between the United States and Europe in the post-Cold War era, 
there were a number of big issues that began to undercut the transatlantic trust.  Cox lists the 
clash over what to do about Bosnia, leaving Washington elite with the impression that Europeans 
could not be trusted with security questions; a difference in regional priorities with Europeans 
focused on Europe while Americans focused on the world as a whole; and, European tendencies 
to favor diplomatic and economic tools while the United States favored using hard power to 
resolve world problems, to name a few, undercut the alliance (212-3).  While these issues tested 
the transatlantic alliance, ultimately, the Clinton administration had the respect of Europe 
through his dedication to multilateralism (at least in theory), humanitarian issues and his 
statesmanship.  Additionally, US economic openness in the era of globalization led to increased 
(sevenfold) US investment in Europe between 1994 and 1998, and trade between the US and the 
European Union rose to $450 billion per year (Bacevich 105). 
When the current Bush administration came into power in 2000, the relationship with 
Europe seemed to quickly take a turn for the worst when Bush began acting in an assertive 
unilateral manner by withdrawing from Kyoto, a treaty to control worldwide traffic in small 
arms, a treaty to eliminate landmines and the Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention and 
making it clear the United States would not be a part of the International Criminal Court (Garton 
Ash 105).   The United States was no longer committed, even in theory, to the basics of 
multilateralism (Cox 215).  Even when the United States and Europe seemed to come together 
after 9/11, when it came time to plan the military campaign in Afghanistan, the United States 
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politely refused NATO’s declaration of Article 5 and instead of relying on traditional allies, the 
United States began looking for coalitions to fit the mission.   
The cracks in the relationship culminated in the build-up to the Iraq war.  Europe divided 
over whether to support Bush’s efforts in Iraq or not—Britain and Spain originally aligned with 
the United States with Germany and France on the opposite side.  German Chancellor Schroeder 
even ran an anti-war, and what could be construed as anti-American campaign for reelection in 
2002.  There were massive anti-US demonstrations on February 15, 2003 around the world.  
Diplomacy seemed to come to an end with insults being hurled on either side of the Atlantic—
for example, former German Chancellor Schroeder called Bush’s foreign policy “reckless 
adventure” (Szabo 23).  US Secretary of Defense classified France and Germany as “Old 
Europe.”  The French openly campaigned for a “non” on the security resolution over Iraq.  The 
United States ignored the dissent of its traditional allies and with a “coalition of the willing” 
invaded Iraq in 2003.  The security aspect of the transatlantic relationship seemed broken down 
during Bush’s first term in office.  It was this perceived breakdown of the transatlantic 
relationship that sparked debate among ideologues, academics and foreign policy elites over who 
was to blame for this breakdown.   
The Debate Surrounding the Transatlantic Relationship 
Robert Kagan’s Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order 
attempts to explain the conflict between the United States and Europe by saying that Europeans 
are turning away from power and living a post-historical paradise of peace and relative 
prosperity while the United States must exercise power in an anarchic Hobbesian world (3).  “It 
is time to stop pretending that Europeans and Americans share a common view of the world, or 
even that they occupy the same world” (Kagan 3).  Indeed because the United States and Europe 
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live in two different worlds, they view the world around them differently.  Europeans want to 
build a world based on soft power because that is where its strengths are (Kagan 37).  Because 
Europe is no longer willing to use hard power, the United States has no choice but to act 
unilaterally (Kagan 99).  Europeans are fearful because the United States can go it alone (Kagan 
39).  Furthermore, the power of the United States and its willingness to exercise that power (hard 
power) constitutes a threat to Europe’s new sense of mission—to live in a paradise of peace 
(Kagan 61).  This discrepancy between America’s hard power and Europe’s soft power has led to 
the split between the two.   
Noam Chomsky believes that America’s reliance on hard power is not because of 
Europe’s lack of hard power, but rather it is used in pursuit of a grand imperial strategy that is 
breaking the alliance apart.  In Chomsky’s book Hegemony or Survival: America’s Quest for 
Global Dominance quotes Donald Kennedy, Science magazine editor, who claims that the 
problems between the United States and Europe began when the Bush administration passed on 
multilateral engagement with the global warming problem (3).  That stance “began the long 
continuing process of eroding its friendships in Europe,” leading to “smoldering resentment” 
(Chomsky 3).  By 2002, the United States declared its intention to maintain its hegemony 
through the threat or use of military force.  It is a “grand imperial strategy” that is alienating 
traditional allies (Chomsky 11).   
Chomsky largely borrows from John Ikenberry’s essay in Foreign Affairs entitled 
“America’s Imperial Ambition.”  The essay is written in response to the release of the “National 
Security Strategy 2002” that changes American foreign policy from a strategy of containment to 
preemptive and preventive use of force.  The “sweeping new ideas” call for “American unilateral 
and preemptive, even preventive, use of force, facilitated if possible by coalitions of the 
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willing—but ultimately unconstrained by the rules and norms of the international community” 
(Ikenberry 44).  This new unchecked power exercised by the United States “will usher in a more 
hostile international system” and runs opposite to the way the United States successfully 
managed world affairs (Ikenberry 49).  “The secret of the United States’ long, brilliant run as the 
world’s leading state was its ability and willingness to exercise power within alliance and 
multinational frameworks” (Ikenberry 49).  The United States pursuing an “imperial ambition” 
has alienated traditional allies, leading to a rift.   
Timothy Garton Ash admits that there were political rifts between the United States and 
Europe in his book Free World: America, Europe and the Surprising Future of the West.  He 
explains the rift by saying that when Milosevic was taken out of power, Europe was not the 
source of an “urgent foreign policy problem for the United States” (Garton Ash 102).   
Additionally, the Bush administration thought it would be easier to deal with individual countries 
than Europe as a whole because of a lack of a uniform European foreign policy (Garton Ash 
102).  Garton Ash, however, does not believe that the rift between the United States and Europe 
is permanent for two reasons: economics and values (the other two legs of the transatlantic 
relationship).  Precisely at the moment when the security aspect of the transatlantic relationship 
was falling apart, economic interdependence grew “spectacularly” (Garton Ash 79).  Half of 
American capital invested overseas in the 1990s went to Europe and in 2001, half the total 
foreign earnings of US companies came from Europe (Garton Ash 79).  Conversely, European 
firms hold roughly two-thirds of all foreign owned assets in the US and sales by European-
owned companies in the US were worth $1.4 trillion in 2000 (Garton Ash 79).  Politics and 
economics moved in opposite directions (Garton Ash 79).  Along with economic cooperation, 
the United States and Europe shared what used to be called “Western values,” now called 
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“democratic values.”  By spreading democratic values around the world, it will keep the United 
States and Europe unified and working together.   
Stephen Szabo discusses the breakdown of the relationship between Germany and the 
United States in Parting Ways: The Crisis in German-American Relations.  He outlines distrust 
on both sides of the Atlantic with American foreign policy decision makers wary of Germany 
and German foreign policy decision makers critical of America’s “reckless adventure” foreign 
policy.  Szabo states, “Given all the changes—both domestic and international—that have 
occurred since 9/11, there will be some parting of ways, a tendency toward distancing rather than 
balancing” (153).  He claims that if there is to be a new partnership, both sides of the Atlantic 
will require adjustments to form a real partnership made of equal partners (Szabo 153).  
“Ultimately, those in power in Washington and Berlin will be the ones who decide whether to 
recreate or destroy a relationship that has proven to be the guarantor of European stability for 
more than half a century” (Szabo 153).   
Michael Cox’s article, “Beyond the West: Terrors in Transatlantia,” outlines the 
problems between the United States and Europe, in particular, the breakdown of the security 
alliance and its structures and international institutions.  Whereas communism had brought 
friends together, “it looks like the new war on terrorism was driving them apart” (Cox 216).  He 
argues due to its marginalization in the campaign in Afghanistan and Rumsfeld’s doctrine of 
missions determining the coalition, rather than the other way around, “NATO is rapidly 
becoming one of the first, and most important ‘victims of 9/11’” (Cox 216).  He points out that 
the increasing unilateralism of the United States and its inclination to use hard power instead of 
soft power is also driving the alliance apart (Cox 212-3).  Despite the United States and Europe 
attempting to heal the rifts in the relationship after the lead up to the Iraq, the two do not share a 
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common perspective on Israel-Palestine, how do deal with rogue-regimes, Kyoto, the 
International Criminal Court, international law, arms sales to China and the means to prevent 
Iran from acquiring weapons of mass destruction (Cox 222).  The United States and Europe do 
not perceive of the war on terror in the same way—the United States sees it as an era-defining 
struggle and Europeans do not (Cox 224).  If the security structures of the transatlantic alliance 
are doomed, unlike Garton Ash, Cox does not see redemption in values and economics.  
European identity and values are changing and are being defined not only in a positive notion of 
Europe, but also in an increasingly negative image of the United States (Cox 226).  Europe will 
become a huge economic force—there is more European investment in the US than there is 
American investment in Europe—and by dismissing Europe politically, the economic 
relationship will also be damaged (Cox 226-7).  Ultimately, Cox believes, “the transatlantic 
relationship as we once knew it now looks increasingly as if it belongs to another age” (227).  
Each of the critiques of the breakdown between Europe and America begin with the 
assumption that one or more of the facets of the transatlantic relationship are broken.  Whether it 
is the security alliance, economics, values, or all of them, the United States and Europe are 
growing apart.  So what exactly is the state of the transatlantic relationship and why does it look 
the way it does today?  Because there is contention about the state of each facet of the 
transatlantic relationship, this question warrants a systematic evaluation of each leg of the 
transatlantic relationship to see where the relationship is faltering and why.  Furthermore, the 
relationship has changed forms all the time—that doesn’t necessarily indicate a split between the 
US and Europe.  Because the world has changed so dramatically since the end of the Cold War, 
the transatlantic alliance should be reevaluated within the context of today’s world.  A systematic 
evaluation involves examining the three facets of the transatlantic relationship to see how they 
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are working in the present day world to measure the state of the transatlantic relationship.  To 
demonstrate how this can be done, I will evaluate the security aspect of the transatlantic 
relationship.    
Measuring the State of the Transatlantic Alliance 
Introduction 
The transatlantic relationship is affected by changes in security, making the transatlantic 
relationship the dependent variable.  To narrow the scope of security, I shall focus on the security 
issue that is a common, salient and imminent threat to both the United States and Europe: 
international terrorism.  I am choosing international terrorism instead of other security issues 
such as dealing with rogue states because international terrorism has directly affected Europe and 
the United States, and combating terrorism is the centerpiece of US foreign policy.   
Research begins with a question.  The question in this case would be how has the struggle 
against international terrorism affected the state of the transatlantic security relationship?  The 
security facet of the transatlantic relationship is the dependent variable and the struggle against 
international terrorism is the independent variable, while the other independent variables that 
affect the transatlantic relationship, values and economics are controlled.    Assuming that the 
economic relationship and the common values between the United States and Europe have not 
changed, the null hypothesis is that the struggle against international terrorism has not affected 
the security facet of the transatlantic relationship and the security alliance remains intact.  The 
research hypothesis is that the international struggle against terrorism has negatively affected the 
security facet of the transatlantic relationship, holding all other things constant. 
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Method 
 The security relationship can be measured using three components: operational 
cooperation, philosophical understanding, and level of respect.   Operational cooperation is 
straightforward—is there operational cooperation between the United States and Europe?  In 
terms of the struggle against international terrorism this means intelligence sharing, support in 
military action, etc.  Philosophical understanding means how do the United States and Europe 
understand the struggle against international terrorism and what do they believe is the best way 
to deal with international terrorism.  Respect means showing consideration for the partners in the 
transatlantic alliance in making decisions, and a desire to continue working within the 
transatlantic relationship.  A healthy transatlantic security relationship involves operational 
cooperation, similar philosophical understanding and mutual respect for the alliance and one 
another.  An unhealthy security relationship means that there is little operational cooperation, 
there are philosophical differences and there is a lack of mutual respect.  Each country in the 
study will be studied for operational cooperation, philosophical understanding and respect.   
 As mentioned in the introduction of this paper, for each country I use statements from 
leaders and public opinion polls for evidence.  I use statements from leaders because decisions in 
foreign policy, while influenced by other political players, are largely made at the top.  I use 
public opinion polls for evidence because the public serves as a powerful check on the leaders in 
democracies.  I gathered statements made by leaders from speeches they have delivered, press 
releases from their offices, interviews they have given and statements reported in the press.  I 
also used newspaper articles for examples of the operational cooperation between countries.  I 
used the Pew Global Attitudes Project poll conducted by the Pew Research Center for the public 
opinion data.  In my analysis I give more slightly more weight to statements by leaders than to 
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public opinion polls, simply because it is the leaders who have the final word on decisions in 
foreign policy.   
The Sample 
 Since there is no overall coherent foreign and security policy within the framework of the 
European Union, I shall choose four countries to represent Europe as a whole.  The first country 
I chose was the United Kingdom.  The United Kingdom (UK) and the United States (US) have 
enjoyed a “special relationship” since World War II.  Since Tony Blair assumed power in 1997, 
Blair has faced the challenge of trying to figure out how to balance the “special relationship” 
with developing a new relationship with Europe.  Blair wanted the UK to become the “bridge 
across the Atlantic” (Kramer 90).  The UK has been the staunchest supporter of the United 
States’s “War on Terrorism” in Europe and supported the invasion of Iraq.  The UK has been the 
victim of international terrorism when the Underground system in London was bombed on July 
7, 2005.  Most recently a plot was discovered in Britain in which would-be terrorists planned to 
bomb at least 10 commercial planes flying from the UK to the US.  The UK is a good measure of 
the transatlantic security relationship because one would expect the UK to be operationally 
cooperative, philosophically aligned with the US and a mutual respect to exist between the US 
and the UK.  If that were not the case, it would be indicative of a serious problem within the 
relationship. 
 The next country I chose to study was Germany.  Germany and the US have been allies 
since the end of World War II.  “US-German relations have been a focal point of American 
involvement in Europe since the end of World War II,” claims the US Department of State in 
their “Background Note” on Germany (8).  The United States pushed for the unification of the 
three western occupied zones of Germany after WWII and since has been committed to German 
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integration into Europe and to the reunification at the end of the Cold War.  The United States 
and Germany remained close until the build up to the Iraq war when Germany took a turn away 
from the United States and toward France.  The personal relationship between George Bush and 
Gerhard Schroeder was by no means cordial, but in Szabo’s book on the German-American 
relationship, Parting Ways, he also shows that the German public favored a turn towards France.  
Angela Merkel, the new German Chancellor, states, “It is in Germany’s interest …to maintain a 
close transatlantic partnership” (Federal Republic of Germany12/6/2005).  Germany has been 
home to international terrorist cells, including the Hamburg cell where many of the 9/11 
terrorists met and worked out their plans.  Germany is a good example of a northern European 
country that is both committed to Europe but also has traditional and historical ties to the US.   
 I chose France as another country to represent Europe.  France and the United States have 
been tied together since France came to the colonies assistance in the Revolutionary War, and the 
United States came to the defense of France in both World War I and World War II.  The 
relationship between the United States and France since World War II, however, has been 
marked with confrontation, especially since the Suez Canal in 1957.  Even the US Department of 
State’s “Background Note” claims the relations between the US and France are “active and 
cordial” (7).  France is highly Eurocentric, and is a voice independent of the United States.  In 
the buildup to the Iraq war, France joined Russia as the main voices on the UN Security Council 
opposed to military intervention.  France is a good measure of the transatlantic relationship 
because you would expect France to be operationally cooperative, but voice philosophical 
differences.  If France is philosophically aligned with the United States and both partners display 
mutual respect, the relationship is exceptionally healthy. 
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 The final European country I chose to study was Spain.  Spain was ruled by a dictator, 
General Franco, from 1939 until 1975 when Franco died.  By the end of the 1970s, Spain had 
transitioned into a fully functioning democracy.  Spain is representative of southern Europe.  If 
Germany and France were part of Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld’s “Old Europe,” Spain was 
part of the “New Europe.”  Spain was a staunch ally of the US-led “War on Terror” following 
the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and Spain was also a member of the “Coalition of the Willing” 
following the United States into Iraq.  That all came to an end when Madrid became the victim 
of international terrorism.  With allegations of Prime Minister Aznar’s government trying to 
blame the Madrid bombings on the ETA, and elections only three days after the bombings, 
Aznar’s administration was removed from power as the Spain elected Zapatero as Prime 
Minister.  Zapatero withdrew Spanish military support from Iraq and since, instead of following 
the US’s mission to spread democracy around the world, has started forming an “Alliance of 
Civilizations” meant to promote mutual understanding between cultures.  Spain is an example of 
a southern European country, and is an example of a European country that has been affected by 
international terrorism.   
The Data 
The United States: Operational Cooperation 
 The United States has worked with allies around the world in an effort to prevent attacks 
by terrorists.  It claims “many nations have rallied to fight terrorism with unprecedented 
cooperation on law enforcement, intelligence, military and diplomatic activity” (United States: 
9/2006 7).  The United States has reached out for help for cooperation on law enforcement and 
intelligence; this can be witnessed by looking at the dozens of arrests and plots that have been 
disrupted due to cooperation between the United States and partners around the world.  British 
 21
law enforcement in 2004 arrested an al-Qaeda operative who was suspected of providing 
information on American targets to al-Qaeda; Germany arrested two suspected terrorists 
planning attacks against US forces in Iraq; Jordanian intelligence has disrupted al-Qaeda plots, as 
have Pakistani, Indonesian, and Saudi intelligence and law enforcement services, to name a few 
(United States: 9/2006 7).  The United States has trained security forces in Kuwait, Indonesia, 
the Philippines, Algeria, and Chad to counter terrorist threats within their own borders (United 
States: 9/2006 7).  Additionally, the United States is increasing the size of its Special Operations 
Forces to support foreign internal defense, and counterterrorism operations—the budget for 
Special Operations Forces has increased by 107 percent to support this effort in the struggle 
against terrorism (United States: 9/2006 8).   
 The United States has also institutionalized its cooperation, in particularly, the United 
States works with the UN Terrorist Prevention Branch (TPB), the European Union (EU) and the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to encourage enactment of strong 
counterterrorism laws and to develop common standards and procedures to reduce terrorist 
exploitation of international travel (United States: 9/2006, 18).  Additionally, the United States 
has worked with the United Nations, the G-8, the OSCE and the Organization of American 
States (OAS), and other international organizations, to “promote the adoption and 
implementation of resolutions condemning terrorism, advanced efforts to prevent and suppress 
terrorism and terror financing, and increased training and other assistance to build states’ 
capacity to combat terrorism and deny terrorists safe haven” (United States: 9/2006, 14).   
 The United States claims that to succeed in the “War on Terrorism,” it needs the “support 
and concerted action of friends and allies” (United States: 3/2006 8).  Indeed it recognizes that 
one of the challenges of continuing the fight against terrorism is keeping their partners engaged 
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to coordinate assistance in the struggle (United States: 9/2006 21).  And while at a policing, 
intelligence level the United States has made an effort to be multilateral, the manner in which it 
cooperates with its allies has not been respectful.   
 Two examples of this is the dismissal of NATO and European allied involvement in 
Afghanistan and the recent arrests in the UK and Pakistan that disrupted the plot to bomb 
commercial airline jets flying from London to the US.  Secretary of State Rumsfeld dismissed 
the requests of the French and German governments who wanted to play a significant military 
role in Afghanistan, saying the coalition had to fit the conflict and their involvement would get in 
the way (Szabo 18).  CIA director George Tenet claimed the best they could do was to focus on 
their own internal terrorist problems (Szabo 18).  This offended the Germans and the selective 
multilateralism the United States was pursuing was off-putting to Europeans (Szabo 18).  The 
United States also caused a stir in the British press when it was made known that the UK was 
pushed into making an arrest in the airline terror plot.  “US intelligence agents told their British 
counterparts they were ready to ‘render’ Rashid Rauf, a British citizen allegedly linked to al-
Qaeda in Afghanistan and who was under surveillance in Pakistan, unless he was picked up 
immediately” (Doward 1).  Britain wanted more time to monitor Rauf, but the United States 
basically bullied the UK into making an arrest.  The Observer claims this revelation “casts new 
light on the nature of America’s relationship in the war on terror” (Doward 1).  The United States 
is pursuing operational cooperation, and is achieving that at a fairly high rate, but its manner in 
pursuing operational cooperation can be abrasive and offensive. 
The United States: Philosophical Understanding 
 The United States has been very transparent in what it believes the struggle against 
terrorism is and how to defeat it.  The US views its “War on Terror” as era defining.  It is the 
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central focus of its foreign policy.  President Bush states in the forward to the National Security 
Strategy 2006: 
America is at war.  This is a wartime national security strategy required by the grave challenge we face—
the rise of terrorism fueled by an aggressive ideology of hatred and murder, fully revealed to the American 
people on September 11, 2001.  This strategy reflects our most solemn obligation: to protect the security of 
the American people. 
The War on Terrorism is viewed by the US government as both “a battle of arms and ideas”--a 
fight not only against people, but also against ideology (United States: 3/2006 9).  In this war the 
line has been drawn very clear by the US—“you are either with us or against us.”   
 The first phase of the War on Terror, involves using military force and “other instruments 
of national power” to kill or capture the terrorists, deny them safe haven, prevent access to 
WMDs, and cutting off sources of support (United States: 3/2006 9).  The US shifted its 
perception of combating terrorism following 9/11 from viewing terrorism as a law enforcement 
problem to acting preventively and “taking the fight to the terrorists” (United States: 9/2006 1).   
“The United States can no longer simply rely on deterrence to keep the terrorists at bay or defensive 
measures to thwart them at the last moment.  The fight must be taken to the enemy, to keep them on the 
run.” (United States: 3/2006 8) 
The United States has “taken the fight to the terrorists” in the military campaign in Afghanistan.   
 The United States has been working with many nations to act preventively in the fight 
against terrorism, as discussed above.  Part of the preventive approach is not to wait for potential 
terrorist plots to approach the imminent stages.  Instead the US will make arrests, even if the 
plots are more aspirational instead of inspirational.  The government will bait the would-be 
terrorist groups with undercover agents posing as terrorists to build cases (Whoriskey 3).  An 
example of this would be the arrests made in Miami in June 2006.   
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 Federal authorities announced they had made charges against seven men described as a 
“homegrown terrorist cell” that planned to blow up Chicago’s Sears Tower and other buildings 
(Whoriskey A3).  However, these “terrorists” never had contact with al-Qaeda, or any other 
terrorist group and had not acquired any explosives (Whoriskey A3).  In fact the plan to blow up 
the Sears Tower had largely been petered out due to organizational problems (Whoriskey A3).  
The Police Superintendent in Chicago admitted there was never any imminent danger to the 
Sears Tower (Whoriskey A3).  When the true nature of the plot was revealed, the government 
became subject to some ridicule.  An editorial in The Boston Globe stated, “We should all be 
worried when something like this gets paraded as proof that the country is making great strides in 
the battle against domestic terrorism” (Walker B1).  The government makes no excuses however 
standing by their commitment to act preventively (Savage A1).   
 Phase Two of the War on Terror—the long-term approach for the US is the advancement 
of freedom and human dignity through democracy as the antidote to the terrorist ideology.   
“The advancement of freedom and human dignity through democracy is the long-term solution 
to the transnational terrorism of today” (United States: 3/2006 11).  The National Security 
Strategy claims that democracy provides a counter to the underlying causes of terrorism by 
replacing alienation with ownership, replacing grievances with rule of law, replacing conspiracy 
and misinformation with freedom of speech, and replaces an ideology that justifies murder with 
an ideology that offers respect for human dignity (11).   
 This analysis of US policy has focused on what the government says and what they do.  
The US public overwhelmingly supports the US-led War on Terror.  As reported by the Pew 
Global Attitudes Project on June 13, 2006, 73 percent of Americans favor the War on Terrorism, 
while only 19 percent oppose.   
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The United States: Respect 
 In the last category of analysis, respect, the United States claims to have consideration for 
its traditional allies.  In the 2005 Pew Global Attitudes Project, 67 percent of Americans are 
reported to believe the United States takes into account the interests of other countries around the 
world either a great deal or a fair amount.  However, the United States planned the campaign in 
Afghanistan without the consideration of including its European allies, that marginalized many 
of them in the lead up to the Iraq War by classifying them as “Old Europe.”  
 Sixty-six percent of Americans in the 2005 Pew Global Attitudes Project favor a close 
partnership with Western Europe—up from 55 percent in 2003.  Additionally, President Bush 
claimed on his first trip to Europe after being reelected, “America supports a strong Europe 
because we need a strong partner in the hard work of advancing freedom in the world,” and 
called for, “a new era of transatlantic unity” (Facts on File: 2/24/2005).   
The United Kingdom: Operational Cooperation 
 The United Kingdom under Prime Minister Tony Blair has pursued a policy promoting 
partnership, or as he puts it engagement, not isolation.  His actions are in line with his beliefs, 
especially on the operational front of the security alliance.  “The United Kingdom is one of the 
United States’ closest allies, and British foreign policy emphasizes close coordination with the 
United States,” according to the Department of State’s Background Note on the UK (6).  The 
United Kingdom has participated in military action in Afghanistan as part of the US-led War on 
Terror.  They also participated in the US-led invasion of Iraq.   
 The United Kingdom also cooperates in policing and intelligence operations.  The United 
States cites the example of making an arrest in 2004 of an al-Qaeda operative who provided 
information on American targets (United States: 9/2006 7).  Recently, the United Kingdom 
 26
thwarted an airline suicide-bombing plot that targeted at least 10 commercial airline jets headed 
for the United States.  There were a combined 40 arrests made in the UK and Pakistan in the 
policing and intelligence operation (Rotella A5).   
The United Kingdom: Philosophical Understanding 
 Prime Minister Tony Blair views the struggle against international terrorism as a war, 
“but of a completely different kind” (8/1/2006).  It is a battle against global extremism—the 
immediate threat coming from Islamist extremism (Blair 3/27/2006).  According to Blair, the 
battle against international terrorism is both a military struggle, but also a struggle of ideas.  
“This is not just about security or military tactics.  It is about hearts and minds, about inspiring 
people, persuading them, showing them what our values at their best stand for” (Blair 8/1/2006).   
“This terrorism will not be defeated until its ideas, the poison that warps the minds of its adherents, are 
confronted, head-on, in their essence, at their core” (Blair 3/21/2006). 
 The first part of the two pronged approach—the military aspect—was already discussed 
above.  Additionally, the UK has developed a comprehensive counterterrorism operation, due to 
its struggle with the Irish Republican Army (IRA) (Rotella A5).  Using well-placed informants 
with human and high-tech surveillance, the British have become “adept at infiltrating and 
manipulating suspected plots in progress to reduce the dangers” (Rotella A5).  For instance, in 
the airline plot, the investigation began almost a year ago in 2005 (Rotella A5).  Peter Clarke, the 
head of the Metropolitan Police anti-terrorism unit said that the men who were involved in the 
plot had been, “subjected to extremely detailed surveillance of every aspect of their lives” 
(Saunders A1).  The police used bugs placed in houses and cars, tapped phones and undercover 
spies placed inside shops the plotters visited as well as outside their homes to track the would-be 
bombers (Saunders A1).  The surveillance and intelligence operation of the UK is marked by 
patience with a desire to see the full scope of alleged terrorist plots.  This stands in contrast to the 
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US.  David Omand, Britain’s former security and intelligence coordinator says, “My experience 
with transatlantic relations is that the Americans are less inclined to risk management and want 
to go for safety first.  That’s not a criticism; it’s a question of a different law enforcement 
culture” (Rotella A5). 
The second prong of Blair’s plan to battle international terrorism, the battle of ideas, 
manifests itself in domestic measures in the UK and foreign policy efforts.  In the most recent 
anti-terrorism legislation passed in the UK, the government made it illegal to encourage or 
glorify terrorism, disseminate terrorist publications either through bookstores or the internet, 
prepare or plan to commit a terrorist act or to help others to do so, and give or receive training or 
to attend a terrorist camp (British Home Office 3/30/2006).  The new legislation also widens the 
grounds for proscription of a terrorist group to include groups that encourage or glorify terrorism 
and increase the maximum penalty for a number of terrorism-related offenses (British Home 
Office 3/30/2006).  These measures were a part of the Blair’s 12-Point plan announced shortly 
after the July 7 terrorist attacks.  In that plan, Blair also laid out his hopes to bring about a new 
power to order closure of a place of worship that is used as a center for fomenting extremism 
(Blair 8/5/2005).  These steps are intended to stifle the spread of extremist ideology within the 
United Kingdom.    
 Blair argues the war against extremism can only be won “by showing that our values are 
stronger, better and more just, more fair than the alternative.”  Blair recognizes that the roots of 
terrorism and extremism are deep (3/21/2006).  He argues the broader global agenda on poverty, 
climate change, trade must be revitalized and that the UK must “bend every sinew of our will” to 
make peace between Israel and Palestine, otherwise the battle against terrorism will not succeed 
(Blair 8/1/2006).  Blair also points out that moderates need to be empowered to counter 
 28
extremism and offer alternative ideas.  He argues that in order to empower the moderates, strong 
alliances need to be build, nurtured and supported in the Middle East, the Middle East Peace 
Process (MEPP) between Israel and Palestine needs to be reenergized, the Iraq crisis needs to be 
resolved with Iraq emerging as a non-sectarian democratic state, and to inform Iran and Syria 
that they either are a part of the international community and play by the rules, or they will be 
confronted (Blair 8/1/2006).   
 Tony Blair’s philosophy on combating terrorism is very aligned with that of the United 
States.  The British public is the most supportive of the European countries studied of the US-led 
War on Terror, but that support has declined to 49 percent, according to the 2006 Pew Global 
Attitudes Project.  42 percent of Britons oppose the US-led War on Terror, the highest number 
since the summer of 2002.   
The United Kingdom: Respect 
 Blair pushes the US to “always be in the lead, always at the forefront, always engaged in 
building alliances, in reaching out, in showing that whereas unilateral action can never be ruled 
out, it is not the preference” (8/1/2006).  Blair preaches engagement, not isolation in foreign 
relations.  It follows that he reaches out to the United States and pushes the United States to 
reach out to others.  After the invasion of Iraq, Blair urged the US to rebuild European ties, 
saying, “Don’t give up on Europe.  Work with it” (Facts on File: 7/24/2003).  To his European 
counterparts, he argues that the only way democratic development can be achieved is by building 
a strong alliance—an alliance that begins with America (Blair 3/27/2006).  He says, “I do not 
always agree with the US.  Sometimes they can be difficult friends to have,” however, “We need 
them involved.  We want them engaged” (Blair 3/27/2006).  He goes as far as saying anti-
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American feeling in parts of European politics is “madness” when set against the long-term 
interests of the world (Blair 3/27/2006).   
 His desire to continue the special relationship between the United States and Britain may 
be a tough sell to the British public.  Only 42 percent of Britons want to remain as close to the 
US and 53 percent prefer a more independent approach to security and diplomatic affairs, 
according to the 2005 Pew Global Attitudes Project.  Opinions of current US foreign policy are 
not high in the UK as only 32 percent of Britons believe the US takes into account the interests 
of the UK in their international policy decisions, according to the 2005 Pew Global Attitudes 
Project.   In the same report, 58 percent of Britons would like to see another country become as 
powerful as the US.  Despite the negative attitudes towards US foreign policy, Britons generally 
have a favorable opinion of the United States.  In 2006, 56 percent of Britons had either a 
favorable or somewhat favorable view of the United States, according to the Pew Global 
Attitudes Project.   
Germany: Operational Cooperation 
 “Germany is a close ally of the US fight against international terrorism” (Auswärtiges 
Amt 12/29/2005).  Even though former Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder took a tough stance 
against the Iraq war, he too said that in the fight against international terrorism, German security 
authorities were closely cooperating with European security forces, and “of course, also with the 
authorities in America” (BBC News 3/14/2004).  Indeed in military cooperation in the war on 
terrorism, Germany provides the largest contingent for the International Security Assistance 
Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan (Federal Republic of Germany 12/20/2005).  Germany is 
participating in both the military fight against terrorism in Afghanistan as well as the 
reconstruction of the country (Auswärtiges Amt 12/29/2005).  Together the United States and 
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Germany also focus on closer security cooperation between security services (Auswärtiges Amt 
3/2006).   
 The new circumstances of the world—no longer a battle of East-West—means that 
comprehensive security “implies that internal and external security can no longer be separated” 
(Auswärtiges Amt 12/29/2006).  Germany has been home to international terrorist cells, 
including the Hamburg cell that was instrumental in coordinating the terrorist attacks of 
September 11.  Germany has used policing and law enforcement to prosecute conspirators.  
Germany has had problems, however, winning convictions in terrorism cases (Whitlock A12).  
In one particular case, a German court originally convicted Mounir Motassadeq guilty of 3,000 
counts of accessory to murder in the 9/11 attack and convicted him of being a member of the 
Hamburg cell.  An appellate court overturned that conviction.  However, upon retrial Motassadeq 
was found guilty of being a member of a terrorist cell, but not guilty of accessory to murder.  The 
new verdict was praised by Interior Minister Otto Schily saying, “A clear signal has been sent of 
the determination of the state in the fight against terrorism” (Whitlock A12).  However, the 
cooperation between Germany and the United States in the prosecution of the terrorist is not 
smooth.  The judge in Motassadeq retrial criticized the US government for refusing to allow the 
court to interview or have access to several captured al Qaeda leaders who he claims could have 
shed light on the inner workings of the Hamburg cell (Whitlock A12).  He also accused the US 
of not cooperating with requests for information and of being uncooperative during the trial 
(Whitlock A12).   
Germany: Philosophical Understanding 
 Germany recognizes the threat of international terrorism and calls the fight against 
terrorism a core task of the Bundeswehr—the German Armed Forces (Federal Republic of 
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Germany 3/29/2006).  The current German government argues that conflict prevention and post-
crisis rehabilitation efforts have become at least as important as the ability to take military and 
police force action in response to threats (Auswärtiges Amt 12/29/2005).  This means that 
military steps are necessary as are security measures such as intelligence and policing, but that 
conflict prevention—such as diplomacy and bargaining is important, as are rebuilding efforts.  
This is evidenced in the manner in which Germany is pursuing the fight against terrorism and its 
foreign policy. 
 Germany’s foreign policy is not centered on the fight against terrorism.  Chancellor 
Merkel wants Germany to assert its credibility at an international level, but she references the 
role Germany is playing in negotiations with Iran and pushing for deployment of the 
Bundeswehr in the Congo (Federal Republic of Germany 3/29/2006).  These are examples of the 
lead Germany wants to take in conflict prevention and crisis rehabilitation.  While Germany 
wanted to support its NATO ally who had been attacked, the German public was hesitant to 
commit to military action; indeed, Schroeder faced an uphill battle in the push to commit troops 
to Afghanistan (Szabo 17).  Germany may recognize the need for military action in dealing with 
threats, but has a hard time committing to provide it.  The German strategy for battling terrorism 
focuses on policing and intelligence work.   
 Germany has dealt with terrorism before, when in the 1970s the Red Army Faction 
(RAF) terrorized Germany.   
“The lesson drawn in Germany from its experience was that the threat of terrorism must be taken seriously, 
but it must be countered with a long-term, incremental strategy relying on extensive police and intelligence 
work” (Szabo 70). 
Schroeder showed his commitment to this policy when he stated, “you do not fight this form of 
terrorism with laws, but with tough persecution and, provided the attackers are caught, with 
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severe punishment” after the Madrid bombings (BBC News 3/14/2004).  Additionally, the steps 
Germany has taken to fight terrorism includes joining the EU Heads of State and Governments to 
agree on stricter security measures in Europe, drying up the financial resources of terrorism as 
well as new initiatives to create greater security (Auswärtiges Amt 12/29/2006).  This is not to 
say that Germany rejects the option of military steps, as Szabo quotes one German analyst, but 
instead Germany prefers a “civilian” approach: economic incentives and international 
cooperation among law enforcement authorities (Szabo 70).   
 Even the law enforcement aspect of Germany’s fight against terrorism has its limits.  The 
German government, both under Schroeder and now under Merkel question the US’s approach to 
combating terrorism.  Merkel, in a statement released after a meeting with Secretary of State 
Rice, stated Germany and the United States want to work together to address the threats of the 
21st century, but that there is a need to find a balance between “a determined defense against 
those who would threaten our freedom and a choice of appropriate means of defense that is in 
keeping with shared democratic principles” (Federal Republic of Germany 12/6/2005).  Merkel 
looked for reassurance from the United States that it respects international treaties and national 
laws in its fight against terrorism—including the ban on torture (Federal Republic of Germany 
12/6/2006).  Furthermore, Merkel has raised concerns about the US’s prisons in Guantanamo 
Bay and has called for its closure (Facts on File: 1/19/2006).  The German public supports 
Germany’s independent approach in combating the war on terror.  In fact, 50 percent of Germans 
oppose US-led efforts to fight terrorism, according to the 2006 Pew Global Attitudes Project. 
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Germany: Respect 
 Germany continues to question the United States when it comes to consideration.  
Germans perceive the US favors acting unilaterally.  A German government website describing 
the transatlantic relationship states,  
“Since the founding of the Federal Republic, multilateralism has been a fundamental component of German 
foreign policy.  Due to its different experiences the US has a different initial position on and understanding 
of this issue.  This explains our differences of opinion on issues such as Iraq, the International Criminal 
Court, the Kyoto Protocol and the Ottawa Convention” (Auswärtiges Amt 12/29/2005). 
Furthermore, Germany, as a medium-sized state, realizes that is has to participate in multilateral 
organizations to make a difference in the world, whereas, the United States has the option and 
the inclination to “go it alone” (Szabo 72).  The feeling that Americans have the inclination to act 
unilaterally applies to the German public, where only 38 percent of Germans believe the United 
States takes their country into its foreign policy decisions, which was reported in the 2005 Pew 
Global Attitudes Project.   
Despite the questions raised by Merkel on the way the US is pursuing the fight against 
terrorism, Merkel states, “We pursue a foreign policy that is in keeping with German interests.  It 
is in Germany’s interest to promote the process of European integration as well as to maintain a 
close transatlantic partnership”—a partnership based on shared democratic values (Federal 
Republic of Germany 12/6/2006). How close the United States and Germany work may be 
limited by the German public—59 percent of whom favor a more independent approach to 
security and diplomatic affairs, instead of continuing a close relationship with the United States.  
Additionally, 73 percent of Germans would like to see a country as powerful as the United States 
emerge. Both findings were reported in the 2005 Pew Global Attitudes Project.  Finally, 60 
percent of Germans hold unfavorable opinions of the United States, according to the 2006 Pew 
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Global Attitudes Project.  All three of these public opinion findings may put a check on how 
closely Germany and America will work together in the future. 
France: Operational Cooperation 
“The US and France continue to cooperate closely on many issues, most notably the 
global war on terrorism,” according to the US Department of State “Background Note” (7).  
Indeed, France has reached out to the United States, making a proposal to express immediate 
solidarity with the US after 9/11 and to proposed to show a military reaction against terrorism, 
against al Qaeda as chair of the UN Security Council, immediately following 9/11 (Chirac 
9/23/2003).  The French have been strong supporters of NATO and participate in the ISAF for 
Afghanistan militarily (US Department of State: France 7).  Despite the difficulties that the 
United States and France experienced over the invasion of Iraq, cooperation between the US and 
France in the intelligence and law enforcement dimensions of the war on terror “remain 
excellent” (US Department of State: France 7).   
Jacques Chirac claims the United States and France have a strong cooperation in the 
battle against terrorism (Chirac 6/5/2004).  Indeed he says, “we’ve considerably stepped up our 
collaboration and cooperation in this area, especially in the last two years” (Chirac 6/5/2004).  
He argues the same cooperation and collaboration applies to the battle against proliferation, 
which demonstrates “exemplary cooperation” (Chirac 6/5/2004).  France monitors and disrupts 
terrorist groups and has processed US requests for information under the Mutual Legal 
Assistance Treaty.  Additionally, according to the US State Department, French security and 
intelligence services have rounded up hundreds of extremists in the past year (US State 
Department: France 7).  France also is addressing the long-range task of defeating terrorism and 
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weapons of mass destruction at the United Nations, the G-8 and among Europeans by drawing up 
more effective instruments within the framework of existing treaties (Chirac 8/27/2004).   
France: Philosophical Understanding 
Jacques Chirac takes a very strong stand against international terrorism, calling for “all 
forms of terrorist attack to be condemned” (Chirac 3/4/2006).  Chirac claims terrorism is “like a 
fatal virus that affects certain societies,” which is why he, “associates himself with anything that 
enables terrorism to be fought successfully” (Chirac 3/4/2006).  Regarding the threat in France, 
French Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin claims, “Never has the threat of terrorism been as 
strong in our country, in Europe and throughout the world” (French Republic 11/17/2005).  
Prime Minister de Villepin argues the threat of international terrorism is based on a complex 
organization that combines fundamental preachers based in France, individuals who are often 
well integrated and speak French and organizers who are skilled in the most recent technologies 
(French Republic 11/17/2005).   
 Chirac claims that by virtue of its history and status as a permanent member of the UN 
Security Council, the French are accustomed to acting whenever international peace and security 
are threatened (Chirac 11/18/2004).  In that vein, France has taken domestic measures to combat 
terrorism and international measures.  De Villepin emphasizes the “key role” of intelligence, 
which lies at the heart of the anti-terrorism system in France (French Republic 11/17/2005).  He 
argues French security services perform “round-the-clock surveillance work on individuals and 
networks likely to suddenly turn to violence” (French Republic 11/17/2005).  Furthermore, the 
French are in constant contact with the international intelligence community in order to exchange 
information (French Republic 11/17/2005).  French anti-terrorism legislation passed in 
December, 2005 emphasized surveillance, increasing video surveillance of railways stations, 
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airports and other public areas, permits official snooping on the Internet and mobile telephone 
records, and lengthens the period of detention for terrorist suspects” (Agence France Presse 
12/22/2005).  Additionally, officials will have greater authority to conduct identity checks on 
cross-border trains and local authorities will have the right to ban certain individuals from 
entering sporting stadiums, among other measures (Agence France Presse 12/22/2005).  These 
domestic measures, however, are not enough.  Prime Minister de Villepin argues to fight the 
threat of terrorism effectively, France needs to work with European partners and the international 
community as a whole with a priority focused on speeding up judiciary and police cooperation in 
the European Union (French Republic 11/17/2005).   
 On the international level, Chirac argues battling terrorism means preventing terrorists 
from operating from States, keeping biological, chemical or nuclear materials out of their hands, 
keeping terrorists away from exploring modern communication resources and taking advantage 
of different laws between states (Chirac 1/4/2002).  Additionally, financing needs to be shut 
down and that terrorists cannot find refuge or asylum—“we must hunt them down everywhere” 
(Chirac 1/4/2002).  The work against terrorism must be completed within the framework of the 
United Nations and in accordance with the law (Chirac 3/4/2006).  As part of the fight against 
terrorism at an international level, Chirac supports an open dialogue between cultures to help 
better understand differences and perceive them in a “spirit of mutual tolerance and openness” 
(Chirac 3/4/2006).  Chirac is a big supporter of Spain’s “Alliance of Civilizations,” an alliance 
designed to promote dialogue and mutual understanding between different cultures.  All of the 
international actions outlined by de Villepin and Chirac to battle terrorism must not be unilateral, 
to ensure legitimacy, according to Chirac (1/4/2002).  “We must make certain that all agreements 
on the fight against terrorism, as well as agreements on non-proliferation, are accompanied by a 
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system of effective international oversight” (Chirac 1/4/2002).  Chirac often links terrorism and 
non-proliferation, and in that sense turns combating terrorism into an effort that must be 
addressed with diplomacy, policing and security efforts and intelligence work.  Like the struggle 
against proliferation, terrorism cannot be defeated with only or primarily military tactics.   
 Chirac does not believe the problems in the Middle East can be changed by force (Chirac 
7/26/2006).  In fact, Chirac argues military operations in the Middle East, particularly in Iraq, 
has hardened relations between Islam worldwide and the West and has sparked conflict between 
Shi’a and Sunni Muslims, thereby fostering the development of terrorism (Chirac 7/26/2006).  
France’s independence from the US-led War on Terror is supported by the French public.  56 
percent of the French are opposed to the US-led War on Terror, according to the 2006 Pew 
Global Attitudes Project.   
France: Respect 
 France argues that terrorism can only be defeated through multilateral efforts.  Chirac 
claims this is in contrast to the United States.  “The US has a vision of the world which is very 
unilateralist.  I hold a multilateralist—which apparently—and I say apparently—is opposed to 
this” (Chirac 5/26/2003).  The French public also believe the United States acts unilaterally—the 
2005 Pew Global Attitudes Project states only 18% of the French believe the United States takes 
their country’s interests into consideration in making international policy decisions.  60% of the 
French hold unfavorable opinions of the United States, as reported in the 2006 Pew Global 
Attitudes Project.   
While the United States is inclined to believe they live in a unipolar world, and would 
like to see that continue (63% of American prefer the US remains the world’s sole military 
power according to the 2005 Pew Global Attitudes Project), Chirac believes that Europe is, and 
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will be in the future a major world power and that we are moving into a multi-polar world 
(Chirac 5/26/2003).  “In any case, there will essentially be two poles: Europe and the US” 
(Chirac 5/26/2003).  85% of the French would like to see the EU or some other country become 
as powerful as the US, according to the 2005 Pew Global Attitudes Project.  In the same survey 
73% of the French would like their government to take a more independent approach to security 
and diplomatic affairs, instead of working as closely with the United States as it has in the past.  
While many of these statements and figures are cause for concern, Chirac believes that there is 
no problem in continuing relations between the United States and France, because we share the 
same values (Chirac 5/26/2003). 
Spain: Operational Cooperation 
“Spain and the US are strong allies in the fight against terrorism” according to the US 
State Department.  After the attacks on September 11th, former President Aznar backed military 
action in Afghanistan and pushed for increased international cooperation on terrorism in the EU.  
Aznar supported the military invasion of Iraq (US State Department).  Aznar aligned himself 
with British Prime Minister Blair, sending a joint appeal to NATO urging the alliance to shape a 
new role for itself in the struggle against terrorism (Agence France Presse 6/3/2002).  In terms of 
coordinating with the United States on security measures, Aznar went as far as to say, “the 
coordination of policy with the US…is essential to our own survival” (The Irish Times 
6/7/2002).  Aznar stood solidly beside the United States, saying, “Spain will act in solidarity in 
the fight against international terrorism, as we wish others will act in solidarity with us” (BBC 
9/25/2003).   
When Zapatero came to power after the Madrid bombings, he spoke on the phone with 
President Bush and both leaders said they looked forward to working together, “particularly to 
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fight terrorism” (Agence France Presse 3/15/2004).  Zapatero told Time Magazine Europe that 
Spain’s firmness in fighting terrorism is as strong as ever (9/27/2004).  Indeed Zapatero 
continued Spain’s participation in coalition efforts in Afghanistan, including maintaining troop 
support in 2004 and 2005 elections, and has cooperated on counterterrorism issues (US State 
Department: Spain 3).  Furthermore, shortly after his election, Zapatero stated he intended to 
increase Spain’s military presence in Afghanistan to demonstrate his commitment to the fight 
against international terrorism (Agence France Presse 3/23/2004).  The Spanish Interior Ministry 
reported it would increase the number of security and intelligence personnel in Turkey and the 
United States, “in order to strengthen cooperation against international terrorism” (Turkish Daily 
News 9/21/2004).  Interior Minister Alonso met with the director of the FBI and agreed that the 
fight against international terrorism could not be fought alone, so progress was made on 
cooperational measures at meeting between the two leaders (BBC 5/10/2005).  The police and 
Civil Guard in Spain agreed to adopt the DNA analysis system Codis, used in the US, and the 
two nations discussed developing systems regarding the detection of explosives and other 
dangerous materials capable of being used by terrorists, and the possibility of improving checks 
on and monitoring of terrorism funding (BBC 5/10/2005).   
Spain: Philosophical Understanding 
Spain, because it has been dealing with terrorism from the ETA, recognized the threat of 
international terrorism and in 2000 supported drafting an international convention on 
international terrorism (Xinhua General News Service 9/14/2000).  Spain took over the agenda-
setting EU presidency for six months following the attacks of September 11 and set the issue of 
international terrorism as a top priority (Teyssou 1/2/2002).  Indeed, Spain’s foreign minister at 
the time, Josep Pique, said, “How can we in all seriousness talk about security and defense 
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policy in Europe without looking at terrorism as one of the major threats?” (Black et al 
2/2/2002).  International terrorism and illegal immigration topped Prime Minister Aznar’s list of 
the greatest problems confronting the EU (The Irish Times 6/7/2002).  Aznar even said he 
regretted that,  
“Despite all the terrorist attacks and all the pain and all the destabilization that terrorist attacks 
cause…there are still people who don’t really grasp the threat and the danger that lie in store for the world 
and for our democracies, which we are prepared and determined to combat, get rid of and defeat” (BBC 
News 11/24/2003) 
 When Zapatero assumed power, he too recognized terrorism as a threat.  As he assumed 
power, The Irish Times stated he was focusing almost as much on his domestic agenda, as he was 
on international terrorism and foreign affairs (3/18/2004).  “The absolute priority remains the 
struggle against terrorism” (Agence France Presse 3/21/2004).  Foreign Minister Miguel Agel 
Moratinos said that the United States and Spain had to work together and united to fight 
terrorism (BBC 6/4/2004).   
Spain: Philosophical Understanding 
 Spain under Aznar looked to fight international terrorism through multilateral security, 
policing and intelligence efforts and through military action.  He supported, along with Tony 
Blair, creating a military mission for NATO with the purpose of battling terrorism.  He linked 
Iraq to international terrorism (Agence France Presse 9/10/2002).  He supported creating a 
general convention on international terrorism in 2000.  As the President of the EU following the 
September 11 attacks, Spain pressed the EU to formally incorporate the war against international 
terrorism into its security and defense policy, which would require member states to pool 
intelligence resources in an unprecedented way (Black et al 2/2/2002).  Civilian security services 
already collaborated closely on terrorism, but Spain’s proposal was much broader, under which 
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the EU would share its military know-how and coordinate the response of member states to the 
threat of chemical, nuclear or biological attacks by international terrorists (Black et al 2/2/2002).   
 When Zapatero assumed power, he rejected the Iraq component of the fight against 
terrorism, but continued Spain’s multilateral intelligence/policing security approach to 
combating terrorism.  Both Germany and France called to congratulate Zapatero and stated their 
governments would share many goals including the fight against terrorism (Agence France 
Presse 3/15/2004). Zapatero, when he came into office, called for improved cooperation between 
intelligence services in Europe (Agence France Presse 3/21/2004).  He has pursued this at the 
EU level and at the G5 level, when in 2006, the countries decided to make available to their 
respective crime-fighting forces deemed useful to help fight organized crime in general (Agence 
France Presse 3/15/2006).  Information that will be immediately available to countries will be 
fabrication of false identify papers, stolen cars, digital fingerprint databases and results of DNA 
tests (Agence France Presse 3/15/2006).  Interior Minister Alonso believed that by exchanging 
information between EU police forces, it would show the EU’s determination to act decisively 
against the threat of terrorism (Agence France Presse 3/15/2006).  Zapatero’s final multilateral 
approach to combating terrorism is his “Alliance of Civilizations.”  It is a bid to bring Western 
and Muslim countries together to overcome mutual misunderstandings and promote dialogue 
between the two (AFX 8/2/2005).  Spaniards support this independent approach to the fight 
against terrorism, as 76 percent of them oppose the US-led War on Terrorism (2006 Pew Global 
Attitudes Project) 
Domestically, near the end of 2004, Spain increased funding for the CNI National 
Intelligence Center by 17 percent to allow Spain’s secret services to increase personnel and 
material costs to “adapt to the need to combat this century’s new risks and threats” (BBC News 
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9/29/2004).  In addition, Interior Minister Alonso assigned three hundred new agents annual in 
Spain to fight international terrorism, leading to 1,200 additional agents in four years to fight 
terrorism (AFX 11/21/2004). Beyond these domestic security efforts, Zapatero stressed that “the 
final and indispensable instrument” in combating terrorism is the “unity of citizens, political 
parties, social organizations and institutions” (Xinhua General News Service 12/14/2004). 
Spain: Respect 
Zapatero argued that, “France, Germany and Spain have a less unitary view of the world 
[than the US].  We have a conception that we need a world of civilization and understanding 
(Time Magazine Europe 9/27/2004).  The Spanish public follows this thinking, as the 2005 Pew 
Global Attitudes Project reported only 19 percent of Spaniards believed the United States took 
their country’s interests into consideration in its foreign policy decisions.  69 percent of 
Spaniards would prefer to have a multipolar world as compared to a world where the US is the 
sole military power (Pew Global Attitudes Project 2005). 
Defense Minister Jose Bono stressed that “security cannot be built in the world without 
the essential contribution of the USA” (BBC 5/3/2005).  He argued that for Spain, “it is vital to 
maintain an excellent relationship with North America” (BBC 5/3/2005).  Zapatero says Spain is 
a friend of the United States (Time Magazine Europe 9/27/2004).  However, 50 percent of 
Spaniards favor a more independent approach to security and diplomatic affairs, as opposed to 
the 43 percent who favor continuing a close relationship with the United States, according to the 
2005 Pew Global Attitudes Project.  73% of Spaniards had an unfavorable opinion of the United 
States in 2006 (Pew Global Attitudes Project).   
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Analysis 
 The state of the security aspect of the transatlantic alliance can be measured by laying out 
the operational, philosophy and respect categories on a table and seeing how the countries 
compare.  The operational coordination between the United States and the European countries 
selected is not perfect, but is fully functional.  The United States needs European help in 
combating terrorism through some military participation, but more importantly in sharing 
intelligence, working bilaterally and multilaterally to thwart terrorist attempts, find terrorists and 
would-be terrorists and prosecute these persons.  Despite some problems with the manner in 
which the United States has acted—being a bully, being disrespectful or being uncooperative-- 
the operational coordination continues between all European countries and the United States. 
 The philosophical category is where the United States and Europe trend apart.  The 
United States and Britain both believe we are engaged in a battle of arms and ideas and see 
themselves as fulfilling an almost messianic mission by defeating terrorism and replacing 
extremism with democracy.  Germany, France and Spain all view terrorism as a major threat to 
the world, but do not see the struggle against it in the same era-defining terms as the US and the 
UK.  This difference also applies to the method the countries employ to defeat terrorism.  The 
US and the UK favor military intervention and a push to spread democracy and to bring the fight 
to the terrorists in addition to policing and intelligence measures.  Germany, France and Spain, 
while supportive of democratic movements, prefer to fight terrorism through intelligence 
sharing, surveillance, policing methods, and tough prosecution under the law.  That is not to say 
that the United States and the United Kingdom do not fight terrorism using the same methods, 
only that the continental European countries studied do not follow the fight against terrorism to 
the next step, like the US and the UK do.  Additionally, on the continent, there is widespread 
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opposition to the US-led “War on Terrorism.”  There is a small difference in the manner in 
which the US and the UK use surveillance methods, the US favoring a preventive, safety 
approach and the UK preferring a long-term, risk-management approach, but the US and the UK 
remain philosophically aligned.  More Britons support the US-led War on Terror than those who 
oppose it, and support for the “War on Terror” is highest in the UK than in any other country 
studied. 
 The respect category is the weakest category in the security alliance.  While Americans 
favor closer ties with Europe and President Bush calls for a new era of transatlantic unity, the 
Europeans are not buying the message.  Of the four European countries studied, three countries 
had unfavorable opinions of the United States and all four stated they did not feel the United 
States took into account the interests of their respective countries when the US made foreign 
policy decisions.  All four countries also wanted to see another power in the world, be it the EU, 
China or some other country as powerful as the United States, creating a multipolar world.  
Moreover, all four European countries favored a more independent approach to diplomatic and 
security affairs, as opposed to continuing a close relationship with the United States.  Three of 
the governments of the European countries believe the US is unilateral.  Each leader, however, 
stressed the importance of continuing the security relationship between the United States and 
Europe.  However the trends of public opinion may put a check on how closely the two sides of 
the Atlantic will continue to work together, and perhaps already has.   
 The United States and Europe are working well together operationally, but 
philosophically they are divided and there is little respect for US power and the US on the 
European side of the Atlantic in popular opinion.  In the present day, according to my 
measurement, the security aspect of the transatlantic relationship works at a nuts and bolts level, 
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but is shifting towards independence at a philosophical level, and there is little respect.  I would 
argue that this is shaky at best.  If the security facet of the transatlantic relationship is shaky, this 
may or may not be detrimental to the transatlantic relationship.  There is a need for further 
research.   
 The research conducted here is meant to be a starting point for further investigation.  It is 
difficult to go in-depth to assess how the operational cooperation is working between the United 
States and its European allies, for example, because much of the work is clandestine.  
Furthermore, the other aspects of the security alliance should be measured, such as dealing with 
rogue states, the Middle East and nuclear non-proliferation to see whether there is operational 
coordination, philosophical alignment and respect in those other issues.  It may be the case that 
the transatlantic partners have differences on other security issues as well, which is further 
damaging the security facet of the transatlantic relationship.  However, the perceived threats 
from rogue states, the Middle East, and nuclear proliferation can differ from country to country 
and that may explain a difference in level of cooperation, and approach to solving the problem.  
Terrorism poses the same threat to Americans as it does to Europeans and has affected 
Europeans as much as Americans.  Due to the similarity in the perception of the threat, this paper 
focuses on the global war on terror because it is an excellent tool to view the workings of the 
transatlantic relationship.  Defeating international terrorism is a battle that requires cooperation 
between allies and is a priority for both sides of the Atlantic.  If the global war on terrorism is 
splitting these traditional allies apart, then there is a problem within the security facet of the 
transatlantic relationship.   
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Broader Conclusions 
More broadly, the economic aspect of the transatlantic relationship needs to be evaluated 
as does the shared values aspect.  In the analysis of the security alliance, I stated that economics 
and values were constants.  That may not be the case.  Economics on the surface seems to be 
strong right now.  As outlined in the history of the transatlantic relationship above, there is a 
considerable amount of trade between the United States and the EU, and there is large direct 
investment by Europeans in America and by Americans in Europe.  It is in the interest of 
economics that the two partners in the transatlantic alliance keep working together.  Economics 
though can change as Brazil, China and India become global economic players and can shift 
investors’ attentions away from America and the United States.  If that were the case, the 
economic relationship would diminish, hurting the transatlantic alliance.  However, that situation 
is hypothetical and it is difficult to measure the transatlantic relationship based on projections of 
future economic conditions. 
The values aspect of the transatlantic relationship needs to be looked at closely.  There 
seems to be a shift in what it means to be European, with Europeans defining themselves as 
much as Europeans as they are identifying themselves as not-American (Cox 226).  Changes in 
leadership can also change the prevailing values on either side of the Atlantic.  This may or may 
not be detrimental to the transatlantic alliance.  However, currently, I would argue that both sides 
of the Atlantic hold strong democratic values, and that they still identify with one another more 
closely than with any other region in the world.  
The remaining two aspects of the transatlantic relationship need to be approached as the 
security alliance was approached in this paper.  They need to be reevaluated based on present 
circumstances.  The security alliance is damaged, functional, but damaged, and that is causing 
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harm to the transatlantic alliance.  Reassessing the economic aspect and the values aspect will 
complement the security evaluation and the true health of the transatlantic relationship can be 
assessed.   
 At the heart of it all, the relationship between the United States and Europe needs to be 
measured in the context of the current global environment.  I prescribed a method in which to 
conduct this evaluation and showed, using that method, the state of the security aspect of the 
transatlantic relationship.  I found there were problems within the security aspect of the 
transatlantic relationship, and that though it may look different than it has in the past and it may 
not be as strong, the relationship is still there.  It still continues.  The security threats of our time 
necessitate cooperation between all countries of the world that wish to live in peace.  The people 
of the United States want to continue a close relationship with Europe, but in order to accomplish 
that, the United States has to treat its partners with more respect and with a little humility.  
Despite the differences between the United States and Europe and the shaky nature of the 
security alliance, I do not believe those rifts are permanent and I firmly believe the United States 
and Europe will continue to work together in a new era of transatlantic cooperation.   
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